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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of financial covenants as substitutes for short-term debt and a possible trade off 
between short-term debt and long-term debt, especially for companies with growth opportunities. Using a sample 
of 159 corporate bonds issued on the Brazilian Market, we found evidence that: first, financial covenants and 
short-term  debt  are  substitute  tools  to  minimize  agency  conflict,  as  per  literature  confirming  that  stronger 
financial covenants could limit the possible expropriation of debt holders and in exchange debt holders may be 
willing to lend at longer terms and; second, companies with growth opportunities are willing to exchange short-
term debt for long-term debt under the presence of covenants. Most importantly, this does not seem to be a 
restriction for financing growth opportunities.  
 
Key words: covenants; agency conflict; short-term debt; growth opportunities and leverage. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Companies with growth opportunities may choose to have an increasing financing leverage. By 
choosing a higher leverage, many companies choose to finance projects by issuing long-term debt. 
Long-term  financiers  may  require  additional  support  from  shareholders  to  enter  into  a  long-term 
financing  agreement,  such  as  restrictions  on  dividend  payments,  additional  leverage,  collateral 
structures and so forth. The use of financial covenants have been used to mitigate possible agency 
costs  between  shareholders  and  debt  holders  which  may  lead  to  suboptimal  investments 
(underinvestment), as suggested by Myers (1977). 
In this paper we study how Brazilian companies have chosen to use financial covenants and to 
what extent this can be used to reduce agency problems. As suggested by Billet, King and Mauer 
(2007), this paper investigates whether short-term debt and covenants can be used as replacement tools 
addressing agency costs between owners and creditors. Moreover, several studies have demonstrated 
that companies with growth opportunities face difficulties in obtaining debt financing, including those 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Smith and Warner (1979), and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995). We also investigated whether financial covenants may negatively impact implementation for 
growth opportunities. The relevance of this study is in identifying the role played by covenants and 
implications for leveraging and financing growth opportunities. Our contribution is specifically to test 
hypotheses related to the substitution of financial covenants and short-term debt by providing long-
term financing.  
The structure of this study proceeds as follows: second section discusses related literature. Third 
section describes our date set, variables and empirical model. Fourth section provides empirical results 
and considerations. Final section concludes the paper.  
 
 
Restrictive Covenants and Short-Term Debt Contributions to Reducing Agency Conflict 
 
 
Since the works by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), and Smith and Warner (1979), 
it has been possible to distinguish costs of value transfer and costs related to agreement mechanisms 
for mitigating conflicts between shareholders and creditors. Regarding the transfer of value, when 
managers seek to maximize shareholder value rather than maximize value for the company, there is 
the possibility of overinvestment or underinvestment in future growth opportunities. Thus, the loss of 
value  to  the  company  resulting  from  this  attitude  is  characterized  as  an  agency  cost.  Moreover, 
mechanisms that help reduce conflict of interests and possible reductions capital cost (debt covenants 
and short-term debt) also have costs related to its accession. After studies by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977), Smith and Warner (1979) realized that the choice of covenants in a contract 
may indirectly and simultaneously affect an enterprise’s other activities, such as investment decisions, 
payout policy and leverage.  
As mentioned by Billet et al. (2007), although it is possible to reduce such agency conflicts 
without  changing  the  existing  level  of  debt  through  the  use  of  short-term  debt  and  restrictive 
covenants, there are some precautions related to a growth opportunity scenario that a company should 
take.  In  a  growth  opportunity  scenario,  the  use  of  covenants  in  debt  agreements  may  limit  the 
opportunities perceived in the future and the use of short-term debt can bring the company liquidity 
risk problems. As these instruments may limit future investments by firms, the logical solution is to 
decrease  the  current  level  of  indebtedness  or  to  use  less  debt  to  raise  funds  in  need  of  funding. 
Therefore, the expected prediction is that firms with greater growth opportunities are less leveraged. 
As debt covenants and short-term debt may limit future opportunities, some companies might prefer 
not to raise debt instruments when they face growth opportunities. That is the reason for predicting 
that growth opportunities and leverage have a negative relation. In this situation, both covenants and V. A. B. Silva, R. Saito, F. C. Barbi    326 
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short-term debt could be analyzed as possible tools to reduce the negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and long-term debt.  
Studies have shown that reducing debt maturity (i.e. issuing short-term debt) can help treatment 
of the agency problem. Myers (1977) found that if the debt matures before the exercise growth option, 
maximizing value to the business can be conducted. Then, it is possible to reduce the incentive for 
achievement  of  underinvestment.  According  to  Barclay  and  Smith  (1995),  in  the  event  named 
contracting-cost, investors tend to refuse investment when there is possibility of transferring wealth to 
creditors. One way to alleviate the problem presented in the contracting-cost hypothesis would be 
reducing the maturity of debt owned and using short-term debt in subsequent issues.  
Billet et al. (2007) followed the results from Johnson (2003) and Childs, Mauer and Ott (2005), 
and  tested  the  benefit  of  short-term  debt  as  possibly  reducing  the  negative  relationship  between 
leverage  and  growth  opportunities.  The  result  was  favorable  to  the  hypothesis  of  a  positive 
relationship between the tested variables. In other words, short-term debt helps to reduce the negative 
relationship between leverage and growth opportunities.  
As well as short-term debt, bond covenants play an import role in mitigating agency costs and 
also help reduce the negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities. Bazzana and 
Broccardo  (2009)  argue  that  a  lender  will  examine  the  trade-off  between  problems  and  costs 
associated with the use of covenants and benefits arising from their use and decide to include them in 
debt issuance, since the benefits are higher. Demerjian (2007) studied the choice of financial ratio 
covenants in debt agreements and found that borrowers with positive earnings, high profitability and 
low volatility earnings are likely to include covenants in debt agreements related to earnings, such as 
coverage of the debt to cash flow. On the other hand, borrowers with losses, low profitability and high 
volatility  earnings  are  likely  to  use  covenants  relating  to  shareholder  equity.  Besides,  Demerjian 
(2007) also showed that covenants related to leverage are attributed to deals with revolving lines of 
credit and current ratio covenants are directed to borrowers with high levels of working capital.  
Therefore, the use of restrictive covenants can help reduce the negative relationship between 
leverage  and  growth  opportunities,  according  to  Billet  et  al.  (2007). To  verify  this  premise,  they 
constructed  indexes  of  covenant  protection  to  check  both  the  relationship  between  growth 
opportunities  and  covenants  as  the  relationship  between  covenants,  short-term  debt  and  leverage. 
Companies with high growth opportunities faced higher agency conflicts. It is possible to infer that 
benefits resulting from the use of covenants are higher for this type of company. However, companies 
with these characteristics are also interested in preserving financial flexibility and future financing 
requirements, which do not allow the inclusion of certain restrictive clauses. Following the authors’ 
argument, this article also predicts a positive relationship between leverage covenant and protection, 
as the risk of issuing new debt is higher in the presence of increased leverage. 
According to the studies mentioned above, we would like to check whether debt covenants and 
short-term debt play a similar role in addressing agency conflict in Brazil. However, the Brazilian 
Corporate Bond Market has its peculiarities. Basically, Brazilian companies can raise funds in the 
local market by issuing Corporate Bonds, commercial papers, private bank loans, stocks and using the 
support  of  Banco  Nacional  de  Desenvolvimento  Econômico  e  Social  (BNDES),  the  Brazilian 
Development Bank.  
Anderson (1999) analyzed 50 Brazilian indenture agreements and found specific characteristics 
for  corporate  bonds  as  a  possibility  to  mitigate  inflation  risk  for  investors,  contingent-maturity 
mechanisms with periodic opportunities for exit or renegotiation, a paucity of covenants that restrict a 
debtor’s investment, financing and  dividend  decisions, and self-enforcement  mechanisms  with the 
purpose of avoiding reliance on inefficient institutions.  
Issuers  have  flexibility  in  structuring  Corporate  Bonds.  For  example,  they  may  promise  a 
payment according to fixed interest or floating interest (by using some kind of indexation). They can 
be convertible or nonconvertible into stocks and also include collateral specifications. Filgueira and The Role of Bond Covenants   327 
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Leal (2001) stated that covenants have suffered changes in Brazilian corporate bonds since 1994. The 
main  explanation  for  this  supports  attempts  at  inflation  control,  started  in  1994  by  the  Brazilian 
government. Sanvicente (2002) presented a study which showed that corporate bonds are an important 
resource of funding not only for public companies, but also for companies that do not have stocks 
traded on the Brazilian stock market.  
Saito, Sheng and Bandeira (2007) studied how covenants have been used to mitigate agency 
costs between stockholders and bondholders. They corroborate the work done by Filgueira and Leal 
(2001) mentioned above, found empirical evidence of looser covenants and showed the purpose of 
corporate bonds issuance; i.e. the destinations of funding raised and reasons for its issuance, such as 
increased working capital, operation investments and debt terms.  
Finally, Silva (2008) applied the hypothesis of optical contractual covenants in the choice of 
accounting  practices.  Results  demonstrated  that  the  use  of  covenants  has  grown  in  recent  years, 
especially coverage of debt covenants and debt level.  
 
 
Data, Variable Measures and Model  
 
 
We analyzed two databases in order to create our sample. Firstly, it was necessary to collect all 
available corporate bonds indentures from debentures.com.br, a website maintained by  Associação 
Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiros e de Capitais (ANBIMA) which contains detailed 
information about all corporate bonds issued from 2000 to 2009. After excluding corporate bonds 
issued by financial firms and finance subsidiaries, we obtained an initial sample of 265 indentures. 
Nevertheless, many companies that issued corporate bonds during this period are not listed on São 
Paulo  Stock  Exchange  (BM&FBovespa),  which  is  a  necessary  condition  for  requiring  Brazilian 
companies to publically disseminate their financial data. We thus ended up with a sample composed of 
159 corporate bonds corresponding to 82 Brazilian companies. Accounting data for these companies, 
such as annual balance sheets and income statements, were collected from the Economatica database. 
Table 1 shows the main features of the corporate bonds analyzed in this study.  
 
Table 1  
 
Characteristics of the Bonds Sample (from 2000 to 2009) 
 
  unsecured  subordinated  floating 
guarantees 
real 
guarantees 
Total 
No. Of Issues 
% of Total Number 
Total offering value 
Convertible 
Maturity ≤ 5 years 
Maturity>5 years 
102 
64.15 
50,810,901,500 
5 
54 
48 
20 
12.58 
7,925,000,000 
2 
12 
8 
20 
12.58 
3,490,000,000 
0 
19 
1 
17 
10.69 
9,510,448,294 
0 
14 
3 
159 
100 
71,736,349,794 
7 
99 
60 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
 
Variable measures 
 
For  each  corporate  bond  issued,  the  prospects  showed  the  incidence  of  many  bond-holder 
protective and issuer restrictive covenants. Covenants were grouped in major categories according to 
Billet et al. (2007), since there are multiple covenants for each type of restricted activity.  
We grouped the covenants into 10 categories (Table 2): V. A. B. Silva, R. Saito, F. C. Barbi    328 
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Table 2  
 
Covenants 
 
Number  Description 
1  Accounting-based restrictions 
2  Dividend restrictions 
3  Reduction of capital 
4  Liquidation, dissolution or bankruptcy 
5  Change in core business 
6  Change in company’s structure 
7  Transfer of or change in issuer’s control 
8  Sale, disposal or transfer of assets 
9  Default 
10  Problems with legal obligations and environmental permits 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors.  
Detailed explanation of each covenant can be found in Appendix A. Appendix B shows the 
proportion of each covenant in our sample. We also checked the incidence of each covenant in the 
corporate bonds according to its classification, secured corporate bonds with real guarantees, floating 
guarantees, unsecured and subordinated corporate bonds in Table 3. It is easy to see that Covenants 4 
(Liquidation,  dissolution  or  bankruptcy)  and  9  (default)  have  high  incidences  in  all  indentures. 
Covenant 7 (Transfer or change in issuer’s control) also have high use between the indentures. Indeed, 
the covenants used the most are related to financial concerns in the analysis of risk prevention by the 
investor in the loan agreement. One important observation is highlighted in the transfer of control 
(Covenant  7)  and  also  in  the  possibilities  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  (Covenant  6  –  Change  in 
company’s structure). These covenants are often used together in the indentures. So, information about 
cash flow and finance and investment decisions seem to be relevant to investors.  
 
Table 3  
 
Covenants in Each Corporate Bond 
 
Classification  Unsecured  Subordinated 
Covenant  Yes  No  % of 
total  
(102) 
Yes  No  % of 
total  
(20) 
Accounting Based Restrictions  80  22  78.4  20  0  100 
Dividend Restrictions  67  35  65.7  12  8  60.0 
Reduction of Capital  34  68  33.3  8  12  40.0 
Liquidation, Dissolution or Bankruptcy  96  6  94.1  18  2  90.0 
Change in Core Business  38  64  37.3  4  16  20.0 
Change in Company’s Structure  59  43  58.0  12  8  60.0 
Transfer of or Change in Issuer’s Control  60  42  58.8  15  5  75.0 
Sale, Disposal or Transfer of Assets  20  82  19.6  7  13  35.0 
Default  100  0  100  20  0  100 
Problems With Legal Obligations and Environmental Permits  11  91  10.8  2  18  10.0 
Continues The Role of Bond Covenants   329 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Classification  Floating guarantees  Real guarantees 
Covenant  Yes  No  % of 
total  
(20) 
Yes  No  % of 
total  
(17) 
Accounting Based Restrictions  18  2  90.0  16  1  94.1 
Dividend Restrictions  8  12  40.0  9  8  53.0 
Reduction of Capital  4  16  20.0  2  15  11.8 
Liquidation, Dissolution or Bankruptcy  18  2  90.0  17  0  100.0 
Change in Core Business  9  11  45.0  4  13  23.5 
Change in Company’s Structure  14  6  60.0  10  7  58.8 
Transfer of or Change in Issuer’s Control  7  13  35.0  12  5  70.6 
Sale, Disposal or Transfer of Assets  6  14  30.0  3  14  17.6 
Default  20  0  100  17  0  100.0 
Problems With Legal Obligations and Environmental Permits  1  19  5.0  1  16  5.9 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
Another interesting analysis involves correlation measurements. Investors can be worried not 
only  about  the  covenants  used  in  each  corporate  bond  classification,  but  also  about  the  linear 
relationships between these covenants.  
According  to  the  covenants’  correlation  matrix,  financial  covenants  (Accounting  Based 
Restrictions) have significant and strong correlations with dividend restrictions, reduction of capital, 
change in core business and transfer or change in issuers’ control. Moreover, dividend restriction has 
positive and significant relationships with most covenants analyzed.  
We can also identify by the correlation matrix in Table 4 that Covenant 7 (transfer or change in 
issuers’ control) has significant and considerable correlation with issues encompassing control rights 
and change in company’s structure, such as merger and acquisition, for example.  
 
Table 4  
 
Covenants Correlation Matrix 
 
   Correlation Coefficients 
Covenant  1  2  3  4  5 
1. Accounting Based Restrictions  1.000         
2. Dividend Restictions  0.3610**  1.000       
3. Reduction of Capital  0.2113***  0.1789*  1.000     
4. Liquidation, Dissolution or Bankruptcy  0.0056  -0.0153  0.0324  1.000   
5. Change in Core Business  0.2521*  0.2712***  0.0419  -0.1349  1.000 
6. Change in Company’s Structure  0.1547  0.2502***  0.2497***  -0.0089  0.1098 
7. Transfer or Change in Issuer’s Control  0.2021***  0.1987***  0.2081***  0.1055  -0.1263 
8. Sale, Disposal or Transfer of Assets  0.1255  0.2321***  0.0691  -0.1497  0.2187*** 
Continues 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
   Correlation Coefficients 
Covenant  1  2  3  4  5 
9. Default  -0.0105  -0.1520  -0.0109  0.1899***  0.0106 
10. Problems With Legal Obligations and 
Environmental Permits 
0.0833  0.0950  0.3018***  0.0791  0.0790 
   Correlation Coefficients 
Covenant  6  7  8  9  10 
1. Accounting Based Restrictions           
2. Dividend Restictions           
3. Reduction of Capital           
4. Liquidation, Dissolution or Bankruptcy           
5. Change in Core Business           
6. Change in Company’s Structure  1.000         
7. Transfer or Change in Issuer’s Control  0.2502***  1.000       
8. Sale, Disposal or Transfer of Assets  0.0893  -0.0246  1.000     
9. Default  -0.0310  -0.0949  -0.2588***  1.000   
10. Problems With Legal Obligations and 
Environmental Permits 
0.0864  -0.1764*  -0.1314  -0.0094  1.000 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. 
Analyses of corporate bond clauses and their correlations are important in order to see how 
corporate bond investors try to choose and combine ways of protecting themselves against default, 
uncertainty regarding future cash flows, transfer of control, transfer of obligations, changes in core 
business and other risks. Therefore, we do not have a significant and strong relationships between 
most covenants and it is clear that covenants are usually combined with other business features. In this 
paper, we mix variables presented by Billet et al. (2007) and include specific Brazilian considerations 
to control for possible internal impacts in the choice of covenants.  
Covenant  9  (default)  shows  a  significant  presence  together  with  Covenants  4  (Liquidation, 
dissolution or bankruptcy) and 8 (sale, disposal or transfer of assets). This makes perfect sense, since 
Covenant 8 shows the collateral capacity a company has to face its obligations and Covenant 4 has a 
strong relationship with default conditions.  
The variables used jointly with the covenant index in our analysis are leverage, short-term debt 
and growth opportunities. Leverage was measured as the book value of total debt (short-term + long-
term debt) divided by the market value of the assets, in which the market value is the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of the equity. Since we are focusing on the 
use of short-term debt as a tool with the same purpose of agency problems reduction as covenant 
index, we measure short-term debt in relation to total debt in a company balance sheet. According to 
previous works, for example, Billet et al. (2007), the main reference in our study, we use the market-
to-book asset ratio as a proxy for firm growth opportunities. These authors followed Adam and Goyal 
(2003), who argued that the market-to-book ratio is the best proxy for growth opportunities.  
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Descriptive statistics 
 
In  accordance  with  Billet  et  al.  (2007),  we  started  the  analysis  by  using  fixed  assets, 
profitability, firm size and volatility as control variables. Nevertheless, volatility was a problem in our 
estimation due to its insignificance in results and its interference in the results of other variables. 
Therefore, volatility was not used in our estimation. A proxy used here for fixed assets is the ratio of 
long-term assets to the book value of total assets. Profitability was specified by the ratio of EBITDA to 
the book value of total assets.  
We also put dummy – years to control for crisis moments (2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 and 2009). 
By crisis moments we mean difficulties in the Brazilian economy and its stock market due to internet, 
World Trade Center, and  Argentine crises and uncertainties regarding the presidential  elections in 
years 2001 and 2002. Years 2007, 2008 and 2009 represent the recent economic global crises. The 
amount of issuance was also used as a control variable. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
main variables.  
 
Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev  Min  Max 
fixed-asset  138  0.5195  0.2106  0  0.9 
leverage  138  34.6043  12.4083  9.1  73.6 
lleverage  138  3.4748  0.387  2.2082  4.2986 
growth  117  0.7055  0.5178  0.01  2.21 
profitability  149  0.0138  0.3511  0  0.2986 
firm size  138  14.953  1.2885  11.7671  18.4122 
Cov 1 – Accounting based restrictions  159  0.7672  0.4238  0  1 
Cov 2 – Dividend restrictions  159  0.5974  0.4919  0  1 
Cov 3 – Reduction of capital  159  0.3018  0.4605  0  1 
Cov 4 – Liquidation, dissolution or bankruptcy  159  0.9433  0.2318  0  1 
Cov 5 – Change in core business  159  0.3459  0.4771  0  1 
Cov 6 – Change in Company’s Structure  159  0.5974  0.4919  0  1 
Cov 7 – Transfer or change in issuer’s control  159  0.0591  0.4931  0  1 
Cov 8 – Sale, disposal or transfer of assets  159  0.2264  0.4198  0  1 
Cov 9 - Default  159  0.9559  0.2057  0  1 
Cov 10 – Problems with legal obligations  159  0.9433  0.2932  0  1 
Total_indcov  159  0.5421  0.1811  0.2  0.9 
indcov  159  0.5890  0.2317  0.3333  1 
Weighted - indcov  159  0.6470  0.2246  0.2392  1 
short-term debt  138  28.2115  21.673  1  100 
Continues 
   V. A. B. Silva, R. Saito, F. C. Barbi    332 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 10, n. 3, art. 5, pp. 323-346, July/Sept. 2013                 www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Table 5 (continued) 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev  Min  Max 
lshort-term  138  3.1074  0.6264  1.6486  4.6051 
log - issued amount  159  19.5168  0.892  16.9935  22.3327 
Note. The table reports descriptive statistics from 2000 to 2009. Each variable is measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
year in which leverage, short-term debt and covenant index are measured. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by 
market value of assets (book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of the equity) and lleverage 
is the leverage logarithm. Short-term debt is a ratio of  current liabilities to total debt and lshort-term is its logarithm. 
Covenant Index (Total_indcov) is the sum of the firm’s 10 covenant indicator variables divided by 10. The next covenant 
index (Indcov) represents the sum of the 3 significant covenants in the first test, covenants five, six and eight divided by 3. 
The last covenant index (weighted-Indcove) is the sum of covenants five, six and eight multiplied by their coefficient β in the 
first analysis, as a proportion of all three covenants β. The variable growth is the market-to-book ratio (market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets). Fixed assets are the ratio of long-term assets to the book value of total assets. Issued 
Amount is the total offering value for each corporate bond. Covenants 1 to 10 represent each covenant analyzed in this study. 
Firm size was specified by companies’ sales logarithm. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to the book value of total assets. 
Log - issued amount is the logarithm of the total offering value for each corporate bond. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
We also tried to control for the influence of corporate governance in the analysis with a dummy 
variable.  Brazil  has  different  levels  of  governance  attributed  by  BM&FBovespa  for  its  listed 
companies. In this case, obligations are not the same and investors may obtain a differentiated level of 
information for their evaluation. We marked all companies in our sample listed in Novo Mercado and 
Nível 2, which are corporate governance segments with higher level of obligations in Brazil, with one 
and  with  zero  otherwise.  In  addition,  we  have  the  interaction  variables  growth/short-term  and 
growth/covenant-index, to check the importance of the interactions in reducing a negative relationship 
between short-term debt and covenants with growth. 
We  noticed  a  large  difference  in  the  available  sample  of  Brazilian  corporate  bonds  and 
companies listed on stock markets in comparison to developed countries, especially the USA. Billet et 
al. (2007) had 1,410 different firms in their sample and we only have 82. However, we could check 
almost all available corporate bonds issued since 2000 for our sample of 82 companies. 
An interesting point to notice before displaying the results is the correlation between covenant 
indexes, short-term debt, leverage and growth. Table 6 shows a correlation matrix. 
 
Table 6  
 
Variables Correlation Matrix 
 
   Correlation Coefficients 
VARIABLES  total_indcove  indcov  weighted_indcov  Lshort-term  lleverage  growth 
total_indcove  1           
indcov  0.6610 *  1         
weighted_indcov  0.6618 *  0.9812 *  1       
Lshort-term  -0.1209  -0.089  -0.1039  1     
lleverage  0.0439 **  -0.058  -0.0593  0.1245  1   
growth  0.2885 **  0.0239  0.0254  -0.1861  0.0542  1 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
When comparing the signs with the US work, indcov and short-term debt have the same sign. 
However, Billet et al. (2007) show a negative and significant relation between indcov and growth. 
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agreements due to problems with flexibility. We did not see a significant signal in our correlation 
matrix. Nevertheless, we did see a significant signal in our results. Short-term debt and growth have a 
negative sign, the same result found in Billet et al. (2007).  
 
Estimation of the empirical model 
 
In order to estimate the relationships between leverage, short-term debt and the covenant index, 
we used Seemingly Unrelated Equations (SURE). The SURE model was developed by Zellner (1962) 
and is appropriate when the endogenous variables are related: the correlation among equations could 
be due to unobservable firm-specific effects that influence short-term debt, leverage and covenants 
financing decisions. The system of equations is composed by three regressions that are related as the 
contemporaneous residuals associated with the dependent variables (leverage, short-term debt and the 
covenant index). We estimate SURE using the exogenous variables as instruments.  
In  the  empirical  analysis  we  first  estimated  SURE  with  short-term  debt  and  leverage  as 
endogenous variables. Together with the variable specified as growth (market-to-book ratio), we used 
a number of exogenous variables as suggested by Billet et al. (2007). In the leverage and short-term 
debt  equations  we  included  profitability,  fixed  assets  and  firm  size.  In  addition  to  the  mentioned 
variables, we put a dummy for crisis periods and a dummy for corporate governance level (equal to 1 
for companies listed in Nível 2 and Novo Mercado). The purpose of this test was to identify which 
covenant is statistically significant in order to be part of the covenant index.  
The first test can be described as the model below: 
lshort-term debt = β0 + β1 lleverage + β2 growth + β3 D-crise + β4 profitability + β5 
fixedasset + β6 firmsize + β7 lshort-termgrowth + β8 Z + ε1 
(1) 
lleverage = β0 + β1 lshort-term debt + β2 growth + β3 D-crise + β4 profitability + β5 
fixedasset + β6 firmsize + β7 lshort-termgrowth + β8 Z + ε2 
(2) 
in which Z means a covenant vector: Z = (covenants 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 and 10).  
After the first estimation to identify which covenants can be used in the index, we estimated a 
SURE  with  lleverage,  lshort-term  debt  and  the  covenant  index  as  endogenous  variables  and  the 
variables specified above plus log_issued-amount as exogenous variables in the models.  
In accordance with Billet et al. (2007), the model including covenant indexes can be written as: 
Lshort-term debt = β0 + β1 indcov + β2 growth + β3 D-crise + β4 lfirmsize + β5 
lleverage + β6 l.issued-amount + ε3 
(3) 
lleverage = β0 + β1 lshort-term debt + β2 growth + β3 D-crise + β4 profitability + β5 
fixedasset + β6 lfirmsize + β7 lshort-termgrowth + β8 indcov + β9indcovgrowth + β10 
l_issued_amount + β11 governance_level + ε4 
(4) 
Indcov = β0 + β1 lshort-term debt + β2 growth + β3 D-crise + β4 fixedasset + β5 lshort-
termgrowth + β5 l_issued_amount + β7 governance_level + β8 lfirmsize + ε5 
(5) 
In the robustness check, we created another index using the coefficient (β) to weight significant 
covenants in the first estimation. As can be seen in the results, Covenants 4, 6 and 8 were significant 
and were multiplied by the proportion of their coefficients (β) to the sum of the three coefficients. This 
covenant index was named weighted_indcov. Moreover, we also estimated SURE with an index of 10 
covenants, in  which  we sum the covenants and  divide it by 10. This  covenant  index  was  named 
total_indcov. 
Billet et al. (2007) explained that the sign between leverage and covenant index may be unclear 
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covenants in loan agreements of companies with higher leverage level in order to obtain protection; 
otherwise  leverage  might  be  moderated  by  covenants.  In  this  regard  we  want  to  check  whether 
covenants and short-term debt are substitutes. In short-term and indcov equations we predict that these 
variables have a negative relationship.  
Chava and Roberts (2008) and Goyal (2003) argued that high growth firms are typically less 
likely to include covenants. Billet et al. (2007) confirmed the negative relationship between short-term 
debt and the covenant index, suggesting that they are substitute tools for reducing agency problems. 
According to the results presented, we check for Brazil:  
Hypothesis: Covenant index and short-term debt are negatively related, which is consistent with 
the view that they are substitutes in addressing stockholder-bondholder conflicts.  
 
 
Empirical Findings and Discussion of Results 
 
 
Now we shall present our main results with the SURE method. We made different estimations 
with covenant indexes. First of all, we tried to identify which covenants were relevant in the leverage 
and  short-term  debt  analysis.  Therefore,  we  put  all  covenants  in  regressions  and  checked  the 
significance  of  each  one  of  them.  After  the  first  analysis,  we  made  a  covenant  index  with  the 
significant covenants. As one can see, Covenants 4, 6 and 8 were significant in the first analysis and 
were used to construct the first index (the sum of Covenants 4, 6 and 8 divided by 3) according to the 
rationale presented by Billet et al. (2007).  
We adopted this method by trying to estimate only relevant covenants for leverage and short-
term debt in Brazil. After that, we constructed another index for the purpose of robustness; i.e. we 
changed  the  covenant  index  with  a  weight  according  to  its  coefficient  (β)  proportion.  Finally  we 
checked the results with an index constructed considering all covenants.  
There  are  variables  specified  as  important  to  explain  short-term  debt  and  leverage  and  all 
covenants classified from 1 to 10 in this study in Table 7. In the short-term analysis, there is a positive 
and significant relationship between this variable and leverage, since short-term debt is the ratio of 
short-term  debt  to  total  debt.  As  mentioned  above,  short-term  debt  represents  a  considerable 
proportion of Brazilian companies’ leverage.  
 
Table 7 
 
Covenant Determinants Estimated by SURE (Test with Individual Covenants) 
 
Continues 
   (1)  (2) 
Variables  lshort-term  lleverage 
lleverage  0.248***   
  (0.140)   
Covenant1 - Accounting based restrictions  -0.00591  0.105 
  (0.134)  (0.0875) 
Covenant2 - Dividend restrictions  0.00141  -0.0264 
  (0.118)  (0.0774) 
Covenant3 - Reduction of capital  0.0606  -0.137 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
   (1)  (2) 
Variables  lshort-term  lleverage 
Covenant4 - Liquidation, dissolution or bankruptcy  0.0344  -0.336** 
  (0.235)  (0.151) 
Covenant5 - Change in core business  0.0980  -0.0483 
  (0.120)  (0.0789) 
Covenant6 - Change in Company’s Structure  -0.303**  -0.0774 
  (0.118)  (0.0795) 
Covenant7 - Transfer or change in issuer’s control  0.126  0.0604 
  (0.119)  (0.0782) 
Covenant8 - Sale, disposal or transfer of assets  -0.0899  0.201** 
  (0.144)  (0.0929) 
Covenant9 - Default  0.364  -0.0583 
  (0.299)  (0.197) 
Covenant10 - Problems with legal obligations  -0.00597  0.0713 
  (0.190)  (0.125) 
Growth  -2.198*  0.260 
  (0.199)  (0.186) 
dcrise  0.0685  0.209* 
  (0.125)  (0.0796) 
profitabily  2.607  -1.519 
  (1.618)  (1.063) 
fixedasset  -0.129  0.184 
  (0.279)  (0.183) 
governance_level  -0.0162  0.220* 
  (0.128)  (0.0813) 
Log_firm_size  -0.129**  -0.0118 
  (0.0536)  (0.0360) 
Lshort-termgrowth  0.718*  -0.0502 
  (0.0607)  (0.0590) 
lshort-term    0.107*** 
    (0.0602) 
Constant  3.912*  3.374* 
  (1.011)  (0.631) 
Observations  117  117 
R-squared  0.607  0.234 V. A. B. Silva, R. Saito, F. C. Barbi    336 
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The variable growth showed a significant and negative relationship with short-term debt. As 
demonstrated by the theory shown in this paper, a possible explanation for this is that companies 
which face a panorama of growth opportunities have difficulties in obtaining funding. This negative 
relationship was also shown by Johnson (2003) and Billet et al. (2007), corroborating the argument.  
We also see in Table 7 that firm size and the interaction lshort-termgrowth showed negative and 
positive significant coefficients, respectively. Firm size was specified as sales logarithm and lshort-
termgrowth was created to specify the impact of the interaction of the endogenous variable short-term 
debt with growth.  
Finally, we can see that only Covenants 4 (Liquidation, dissolution or bankruptcy), 6 (change in 
Company’s Structure) and 8 (sale, disposal or transfer of assets) were significant to the leverage and 
short-term analysis.  
Covenant 4 (Liquidation, dissolution or bankruptcy) has a negative relationship with leverage. 
This might demonstrate a possible difficulty a company can face in the attempt to borrow resources if 
under this clause’s conditions. Covenant 6 (change in Company’s Structure) is negatively related to 
short-term debt. Change in Company’s Structure means here that companies are not allowed to be part 
of other companies or to let others be part of the company who issued the corporate bond (Merger, 
Split or Privatization, for example). This is the first indication that short-term debt and covenants act 
as substitutes when seeking to minimize agency conflicts. Covenant 8 (sale, disposal or transfer of 
assets) has a positive relationship with leverage; this might show a collateral importance to leverage.  
However, Billet et al. (2007) mentioned that the sign between leverage and covenants can be 
unclear, since higher leverage may coincide with more covenant protection, or differently, leverage 
can  be  lower  in  the  presence  of  covenants  in  outstanding  debt  issues  with  future  debt  finance 
restrictions. In this study, the significance of Covenants 4, 6 and 8 have more importance in creating 
subsequent covenant indexes, a condition for proceeding with analysis according Billet et al. (2007). It 
is also a way of trying to capture only the relevant covenants in the Brazilian context.  
Another  noteworthy  observation  is  that  the  leverage  equation  also  shows  a  positive  and 
significant  relationship  between  leverage  and  the  dummy  variables  Dcrisis  and  governance  level. 
Governance level might be explained as a good condition that companies show to become leveraged. 
The crisis sign is still unclear for us.  
In the SURE (using covenant index – Table 8) panel, it is possible to notice the confirmation of 
this study’s hypothesis 1: Short-term debt and the covenant index (indcov) showed a negative and 
significant relationship. This indicates that they can be seen as substitute tools for reducing agency 
conflicts. This argument was mentioned by Billet et al. (2007), who explained that covenants and 
short-term debt help reduce the incentive for the achievement of underinvestment and transference of 
value among creditors and owners.   
 
Table 8  
 
Covenant Determinants Estimated by SURE (Test Using Covenant Index) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables  Lshort-term  lleverage  indcov 
lshort-term    0.126**  -0.110* 
    (0.0630)  (0.0376) 
growth  -1.324*  0.354  -0.212* 
  (0.372)  (0.248)  (0.115) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables  Lshort-term  lleverage  indcov 
Profitability    -1.438   
    (1.081)   
Fixedasset    0.273  0.129 
    (0.190)  (0.117) 
Indcov  -1.721*  0.241   
  (0.473)  (0.231)   
indcovgrowth  1.739*  -0.385   
  (0.582)  (0.284)   
governance_level    0.239*  0.0526 
    (0.0838)  (0.0523) 
Log_issued_amount  -0.0320  -0.0229  -0.0211 
  (0.0973)  (0.0474)  (0.0291) 
Log_firm_size  -0.0196  -0.00456  -0.0112 
  (0.0711)  (0.0404)  (0.0215) 
dcrise  0.0672  0.180**  0.108** 
  (0.175)  (0.0817)  (0.0502) 
Lshort-term_growth    -0.00270  0.0790** 
    (0.0618)  (0.0371) 
lleverage  0.543*    0.000511 
  (0.186)    (0.0561) 
Constant  3.271***  3.145*  1.377** 
  (1.788)  (0.896)  (0.553) 
Observations  117  117  117 
R-squared  0.108  0.121  0.088 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
The variable growth also showed a negative and significant relationship with short-term debt in 
our analysis. According to Adam and Goyal (2003) and Billet et al. (2007), there is evidence that 
market-to-book ratio can be accepted as an excellent proxy for growth opportunities. As such short-
term debt represents a great proportion of Brazilian company indebtedness, it is possible to infer that 
companies with higher levels of growth opportunities face more difficulties in obtaining short-term 
funding.  
The  interaction indcovgrowth can be understood as responsible for  minimizing the  negative 
relationship between short-term debt and growth. This result supports the prediction that covenants 
can help to attenuate the negative effect of growth opportunities in short-term debt. Billet et al. (2007) 
showed the same result for leverage and the interaction between the covenant index and growth, i.e. it 
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In the same direction as the first equation, leverage explains short-term debt with a positive and 
significant signal. Again, the variable governance_level showed a positive and significant relationship 
with leverage. As explained before, this variable seems to be relevant for companies to raise funds.  
In the indcov equation we confirm the negative and significant relationship between short-term 
debt and covenants; this helps to strengthen the main hypothesis of this study. The dummy variable for 
crises remains positive and significant in the leverage and indcov equations.  
The  interaction lshort-term_growth also  helps to attenuate the  negative relationship between 
indcov and growth. This helps to strengthen the hypothesis that short-term debt and covenants are 
substitutes.  
 
Robustness check 
 
As mentioned before, in the robustness check we estimated the same model but modified the 
covenant  index.  Here  we  constructed  a  covenant  index  with  different  weights.  A  balance  among 
Covenants 4, 6 and 8 was made via their coefficient (β) proportion. We first summed each coefficient 
(0.336 + 0.303 + 0.201) in module, since we were not concerned with their sign relation, but with their 
ratio (proportion of the coefficient) and then divided each coefficient by the sum. After getting the 
proportion of each coefficient, we multiplied the proportions by Covenants 4, 6 and 8 in the sample.  
Modifying the covenant index did not change the previous interpretation. Short-term debt and 
growth still show a negative and significant sign. In a module analysis, the second coefficient is still 
higher  than  the  first  one.  The  same  happens  with  the  relation  between  short-term  debt  and  the 
covenant  index.  The  covenant  index  coefficient  (Weighted_indcov)  is  higher  than  the  coefficient 
showed  in  indcov  in  a  module  analysis.  The  relationship  between  leverage  and  short-term  debt 
remains the same. The variable governance_level is still important to the leverage equation.  
We also estimated these tests with other control variables. For example, prospect specificities 
such as the possibility  of convergence  of debt in stocks and the classification  of corporate bonds 
(unsecured,  subordinated,  floating  or  real  guarantees)  were  used  in  the  attempt  to  capture  more 
significant  relationships  between  variables.  Nevertheless,  they  were  not  significant.  The  weighted 
covenant index estimation is specified in Table 9, below:  
 
Table 9 
 
Covenant Determinants Estimated by SURE (Test Using Weighted Covenant Index) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables  Lshort-term  lleverage  Weighted_indcov 
Lshort-term    0.114***  -0.105* 
    (0.0629)  (0.0361) 
growth  -1.387*  0.393  -0.192*** 
  (0.404)  (0.261)  (0.110) 
profitability    -1.437   
    (1.074)   
fixedasset    0.288  0.126 
    (0.189)  (0.112) 
Weighted_indcov  -1.807*  0.125   
  (0.503)  (0.244)   
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables  Lshort-term  lleverage  Weighted_indcov 
Weighted_indcovgrowth  1.685*  -0.455   
  (0.581)  (0.280)   
Governance_level    0.246*  0.0472 
    (0.0832)  (0.0502) 
Log_issued_amount  -0.0396  -0.0233  -0.0157 
  (0.0974)  (0.0471)  (0.0279) 
log_firm_size  -0.0166  -0.00742  -0.0145 
  (0.0712)  (0.0402)  (0.0206) 
dcrise  0.0870  0.199**  0.127* 
  (0.177)  (0.0816)  (0.0482) 
Lshort-term_growth    0.00876  0.0737** 
    (0.0613)  (0.0356) 
lleverage  0.532*    -0.0630 
  (0.186)    (0.0537) 
Constant  3.563**  3.275*  1.578* 
  (1.806)  (0.898)  (0.530) 
       
Observations  117  117  117 
R-squared  0.105  0.127  0.091 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
In order to check if an index constructed with all covenants has the same relationships presented 
above, we made an index that is the sum of 10 covenants divided by 10. Here we sum from Covenant 
1 to Covenant 10 independent of their significance in the first equation, as suggested by Billet et al. 
(2007). The results can be seen in Table 10 below.  
 
Table 10  
 
Covenant Determinants Estimated by SURE (Test Using a Total Covenant Index) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables  Lshort-term  lleverage  Total_indcov 
           
Lshort-term    0.132**  -0.0456*** 
    (0.0607)  (0.0274) 
growth  -0.764  0.764**  0.0494 
  (0.576)  (0.322)  (0.0834) 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables  Lshort-term  lleverage  Total_indcov 
Profitability    -1.353   
    (1.072)   
Fixedasset    0.314***  -0.00173 
    (0.186)  (0.0851) 
Total_indcov  -1.372***  0.697**   
  (0.744)  (0.333)   
Total_indcovgrowth  0.910  -0.986**   
  (0.931)  (0.413)   
Governance_level    0.243*  0.0549 
    (0.0830)  (0.0381) 
Log_issued_amount  -0.0328  -0.0311  -0.0132 
  (0.101)  (0.0468)  (0.0212) 
Log_firm_size  -0.0202  -0.0125  -0.0155 
  (0.0741)  (0.0398)  (0.0156) 
dcrise  0.0753  0.183**  0.0873** 
  (0.183)  (0.0809)  (0.0365) 
Lshort-term_growth    -0.0225  0.0125 
    (0.0596)  (0.0270) 
lleverage  0.563*    0.0205 
  (0.195)    (0.0408) 
Constant  2.906  3.142*  0.997** 
  (1.859)  (0.872)  (0.402) 
       
Observations  117  117  117 
R-squared  0.046  0.152  0.147 
Note. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
We confirm a significant negative relationship between the covenant index and short-term debt, 
as shown in the first analysis (Table 8). The variable leverage remains with the same sign and is still 
significant in the short-term equation. The leverage equation maintains significant and with the same 
sign, but the coefficient  is  not as strong as it is in  the same short-term  equation as the previous 
analysis. The total_indcov equation still shows a significant negative relationship with short-term debt. 
Once  again,  the  dummies  for  crises  demonstrate  a  significant  and  positive  relationship  with  the 
covenant index and leverage. Another possible explanation for this relationship is that in crisis periods 
more covenants can be demanded by bondholders, which makes it easier for a company to borrow 
money (since this meets some creditors’ wishes).  
Another interesting result is the role  of short-term  debt  in  our study. Since short-term  debt 
presents  an  important  way  of  raising  funding  in  Brazil,  it  is  possible  to  infer  that  it  has  a  more The Role of Bond Covenants   341 
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important  role  than  covenants  in  reducing  agency  conflicts.  Moreover,  short-term  debt  presents  a 
positive relationship with growth opportunities when covenants and growth are analyzed together.  
We notice that the relationship between size and short-term debt is negative and statistically 
significant in Table 7. This provides some empirical evidence that companies with more assets may 
have assets in long-term finance controlling for other variables, such as corporate governance levels. 
On the other hand, smaller companies basically use their current assets (e.g. receivables) for short-
term financing.  
This paper might assist financial managers in assessing the trade-off of accessing short-term and 
long-term financing options. Given the financial covenants in instruments, such as bonds, the financial 
manager may want to analyze the trade-off of having some limitations or restrictions in dividends, 
investments and financing in order to access long-term financing with a lower risk of refinancing.  
Therefore, we could check in all analyses that the hypothesis that covenants and short-term debt 
are  substitutes  seems  to  be  valid.  The  other  significant  results  are  the  importance  of  the  variable 
governance_level  dummy for crises and the  interactions between the covenant indexes and short-
maturity with growth (with the purpose of minimizing the relationships). Both of these are new in 
Brazilian studies, for which the equations were estimated by a model that controlled the endogenous 
problem in the variables leverage, short-term debt and covenants.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The main purpose of this work was to verify whether short-term debt and restrictive covenants 
can be considered substitutes or complementary in reducing the agency problem. Furthermore, we 
intended  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  financial  covenants  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
studied companies in the sample and to check whether the use of covenants can minimize the negative 
relationship between short-term and growth opportunities and whether short-term debt minimizes the 
negative relationship between covenants and growth opportunities, as demonstrated by Billet et al. 
(2007) with leverage and growth opportunities.  
Our results may corroborate the negative relationship between covenants and short-term debt as 
tools  to  minimize  agency  problems.  We  also  found  some  important  control  variables,  such  as 
corporate governance level, a dummy for crisis periods in the first years after 2000, and the result of 
interactions between short-term debt and covenant indexes with growth. Based on its proportion in 
companies’  indebtedness  levels, in  our  study  short-term  debt  showed  similar  results  concerning  a 
negative relationship with growth opportunities as leverage did in previous works. In addition to its 
proportion, we also argue for the importance of short-term debt for Brazilian companies as a limited 
way of debt funding in Brazil. 
Therefore,  this  paper  contributes  to  the  finance  literature  as  the  first  work  to  study  the 
endogenous relationship between the variables mentioned above and covenants in Brazil. It also has 
practical results specified  in how covenants are combined between prospectuses. We confirm that 
covenants and short-term  debt can be  considered substitutes  in addressing stockholder-bondholder 
conflicts.  
Future research can be conducted to analyze whether the hypothesis can be proved empirically 
in other emerging countries. Another possibility for continuing this study is to identify another method 
that may be used to treat the endogenous problem specified in this study through the same or other 
variables. Moreover, it is also important for future research to mention the role of BNDES in relation 
to companies that face growth opportunities. In this context, it would be interesting to study whether 
covenants play a similar role in the presence of short-term and long-term leverage.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
 
Covenants 
 
 
Covenant 1: Accounting Based Restrictions. Ratio covenants. 
a) (DEBT/EBITDA): Variable Debt means the sum of all consolidated debts from a company. Some 
companies used net debt instead of total debt. EBITDA is the earnings before interest, depreciation 
and amortization. 
b) (Interest Coverage Index): This index is the proportion of EBITDA divided by net debt.  
c)  (Short-term  debt  /  EBITDA):  Another  financial  covenant  to  maintain  the  firm  under  certain 
conditions. Short-term debt means all debts that mature within one year or less. 
d) (Debt/Equity): This covenant specifies a limit of indebtedness measured by the proportion of Debt 
(all debts) to Equity. 
e) (Other Financial Covenants): Here we group financial covenants that do not appear often in the 
prospects. For example, a minimum level of net worth, limits for bank debts and bank debts divided by 
net worth. 
f) (EBITDA/CAPEX): A covenant that specifies a measure of how a company can cover its capital 
needs using internal funding.  
Covenant 2: Dividend Restrictions.  
(Dividend  Restrictions):  This  covenant  stipulates  a  limit  of  dividends  that  must  be  paid  or  a 
prohibition of dividend payments. 
Covenant 3: Reduction of Capital. 
The issuer of the corporate bond must not reduce their capital/net worth in the company.  
Covenant 4: Liquidation, Dissolution or Bankruptcy. 
The company must not allow its own Liquidation, Dissolution or Bankruptcy.  
Covenant 5: Change in Core Business.  
It is not allowed to change the main purpose of a company. It has to do what it is widely known to do 
for clients.   
Covenant 6: Change in Company’s Structure; 
a) Merger, Split or Privatization: Companies are not allowed to be part of other companies or to let 
others be part of the company who issued the corporate bond.  
b) Change in legal structures: Companies must also maintain their legal structures. In Brazil, we have 
corporations with their capital listed on a stock market and corporations that are not listed on stock 
markets that can issue corporate bonds. This covenant does not allow  change in companies’ legal 
structures and, therefore, the corporations that are not listed on a stock market at the moment of the 
loan agreement cannot try to participate in the stock market while corporate bonds exist.  
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Covenant 7: Transfer or Change in Issuer’s Control. 
The company that issues a corporate bond cannot change its controlling stockholders and its main 
directors. 
Covenant 8: Sale, Disposal or Transfer of Assets. 
Companies are not allowed to sell, negotiate or use the companies’ assets for other purposes.  
Covenant 9: Default. 
a) The company must pay all its debts in time.  
b) Lowering the credit rating: In accordance with a rating agency, companies cannot have a reduction 
in their risk classification.  
Covenant 10: Problems with legal obligations and environmental permissions. 
All licenses and work contracts that a company has must be in perfect condition. The company cannot 
be part of environmental problems and must face all their legal obligations. 
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APPENDIX B  
Figure 1. Covenants in the Sample (2000 – 2009).  
This graph shows the proportion of each covenant of our sample since 2000. 
Source: elaborated by the author. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Brazilian Companies’ Funding from 2004 – 2009.  
This graph shows Brazilian companies’ funding from 2004 – 2009.  
Source: Coutinho, L. (2010). Desafios do financiamento a longo prazo [Almoço-Palestra]. São Paulo: Instituto Brasileiro de 
Executivos de Finanças. Retrieved from 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/Galerias/Arquivos/empresa/download/apresentacoes/Cou
tinho_DesafiosFinancLP_ago10.pdf 
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